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Operational dilemmas in safety-critical industries: the tension between organizational 
reputational concerns and the effective communication of risk  
Abstract 
Organizations involved in safety-critical operations often deal with operational tensions 
especially when involved in safety-critical incidents that is likely to violate safety. In this paper, 
we set out to understand how the disclosures of safety-critical incidents take place in the face 
of reputational tension. Based on the case of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC), we draw on image repair theory (IRT) and information manipulation theory (IMT) 
and adopt discourse analysis as a method of analysing safety-critical incident press releases 
and reports from the NNPC.  We found NNPC deploying image repair as part of incident 
disclosures to deflect attention, evade blame and avoid issuing apologies. This is supported by 
the by violation of the conversational maxims. The paper provides a theoretical model for 
discursively assessing the practices of incident information disclosure by an organization in the 
face of reputational tension, and further assesses the risk communication implications of such 
practices. 
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1. Introduction  
Safety-critical operations such as in the petroleum industry consists of complex sociotechnical 
systems of “people in multiple roles and their artifacts [e.g., assets, technology and 
organizations]” (Lwears, 2012, pp.4561 ). These sociotechnical systems need to possess the 
highest levels of safety integrity as failures or malfunctions from the system(s) would lead to 
catastrophic incidents with the potential of violating public, environmental and asset safety 
(Ambituuni, Hopkins, Amezaga, Werner, & Wood, 2015). Because of this operational 
dynamic, there are a number of tensions and trade-offs within safety-critical industry 
organizations. These tensions are captured in literature and include the profit versus safety 
tension (Baron & Pate-Cornell, 1999; Kettunen, Reiman, & Wahlström, 2007; Perin, 2005; 
Reiman & Rollenhagen, 2012); the organization versus the regulator’s divergent views on 
safety regulation and documentation (A. Ambituuni, Amezaga, & Werner, 2015; Kettunen et 
al., 2007); and the safety versus performance tension (Amalberti, 2001). These trade-offs and 
tensions needs to be managed to maintain safe sociotechnical operations. But what further 
tension exist in the event that safety is violated by an incident involving such organizations, 
e.g., a failure of petroleum pipeline? Indeed, incidents involving such safety-critical petroleum 
operations are likely to have devastating consequences (A. Ambituuni et al., 2015) with image 
damaging implications to the operating organization.  
Thus, when an organization is involved in an image damaging incident, such organization is 
likely to deploy certain image repair or restoration practices (McCoy, 2014) amidst reputational 
tension. The contemporary organization  research on image repair brings to light the practices 
of image repair discourse (Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Benoit, 1994; Muralidharan, 
Dillistone, & Shin, 2011). Furthermore, the seminal work of Benoit (1994) on image repair 
provides a theoretical conception of how organizations attempt to correct negative public 
perception of themselves following a specific incident or series of incidents. Recent research 
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has opened up the domain of critically assessing the safety measures in organizations involved 
in safety-critical incidents, [e.g., BP and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster (Amernic & 
Craig, 2017)] in light of the image repair strategy deployed by the organization (Harlow, 
Brantley, & Harlow, 2011). Research also shows that effective disclosure of incidents by an 
organization  ensures that adequate safety and emergency management information is available 
and lessons learned (Crichton, Ramsay, & Kelly, 2009; Enander, 2018). Whilst the 
aforementioned research provides justification for incident disclosure, the reputation of the 
organization  remains at tension with the principles of effective incident and risk 
communication (Smillie & Blissett, 2010) especially when there is the need to communicate 
and disclose such information with the accurate veracity, manner, quality and quantity. 
In this paper, we set out to develop an understanding of how the effective communication of 
safety-critical incidents take place in the face of reputational tension. We focus on the 
disclosure of incidents by the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) following 
incidents involving NNPC’s safety-critical assets. We turn to image repair theory (IRT) 
(Benoit, 1994) and information manipulation theory (IMT) (McCornack, Levine, Solowczuk, 
Torres, & Campbell, 1992) as a twin theoretical lens through which we analysed the archival 
data from the NNPC using a case study approach. Our choice of the NNPC is purposive because 
of the historic records of safety-critical incidents that the organization has been involved in 
(see for example: A. Ambituuni et al., 2015, 2018; Anifowose et al., 2012). As a petroleum 
industry organization, the NNPC operates in the context of societal dynamics of risk 
management, hence, and knowledge of incidents involving its operational assets builds both a 
social construct (Haukelid, 2008; Silbey, 2009) and ontological realism (Aven & Renn, 2010) 
of its performance. Therefore, we ask, when involved in a safety-critical incident, how does the 
NNPC communicate safety-critical incidents in the face of reputational tension? What image 
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or reputational repair practices are deployed and how is incident information disseminated 
from the perspectives of veracity, manner, quality and quantity. 
We found that during incident disclosure, and in the face of reputational tension, NNPC 
violates conversational maxims to deflect attention, evade blame and avoid issuing an apology 
whilst deploying image repair strategies. This approach has wider safety and risk 
communication implication. We found that prioritising the image of the organization through 
deflection during incident disclosure falsely influences reception and acceptance of risk 
information by potential risk-receptors which has further safety implication on emergency 
response especially where the seriousness and potential consequence of the incident is 
downplayed such that it further exposes people to greater danger. Our findings also contribute 
theoretically by providing a framework that will enable critical assessment of the veracity, 
manner, quality and quantity of information released by organizations whilst disclosing 
incidents.  
2. Looking through a twin theoretical lens of IRT and IMT 
The knowledge that an organization has been involved in an incident with safety and 
environmental implications threatens the reputation of the organization. Indeed, for such an 
organization, the incident, or the asset involved in the incident will be seen as violating the 
safety of people, the environment and properties, hence putting them at risk. This is especially 
true when defining safety as a condition where nothing goes wrong or, more cautiously, as a 
condition where the number of things that went wrong is acceptably small (Hollnagel, 2016). 
Boholm & Corvellec (2011) conceptualised risk as stemming from situated cognition that 
ascertains a relationship of risk linking two objects, a risk object (e.g. explosion, fire, petroleum 
pipeline leaks) and an object at risk (e.g. humans or natural environment at risk). The causal 
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and contingent link is such that the risk object is considered, in some way and under certain 
circumstances, to threaten the valued object at risk.  
The risk perspective of an object at risk can be constructed by the ‘object’ itself, e.g., when 
people raise concern about their own safety in the event of safety critical incidents, or on behalf 
of the object e.g. when people raise concern about the safety of the environment. This 
perspective is shaped by the ontology of risk to its epistemology, i.e., from the nature of risk to 
risk as a social construct (Hilgartner, 1992). The ontology of risk conceptualizes the extent to 
which risk exist independent of an assessor or communicator perspectives, whilst the 
epistemology of risk conceptualizes risk in the context of knowledge of risk and lack thereof, 
therefore, contributing to making issues of risk complications. Hence, when an organization  is 
seen to have put an object at risk, such an organization engages discourse and communication 
as a way to socially construct its reputation and/or repair its image and shape the epistemology 
of risk (Coombs, Frandsen, Holladay, & Johansen, 2010; Coombs & Holladay, 2012). Indeed, 
the timing and the point at which an organization  deploys image repair strategies following an 
incident is equally important (Coombs et al., 2010; Sturges, 1994). Image and reputation 
management communication should only happen after addressing public safety especially in 
safety critical situations. Risk receptors must know how to safeguard themselves based on 
factual incident information before the organization  considers reputational concerns (Seeger, 
2006; Ulmer, 2001).  
Benoit (1994) asserted that image repair (also known as image restoration) is a discursive 
practice that provides persuasive message or group of messages in response or defence of 
negative threats to the image of an organization. Threats to image consists of two elements, 
i.e., the “blame” element which is linked to the beliefs of an audience, and the “offensiveness” 
which is associated to the value systems of the audience.  Image repair discourse, therefore, 
rejects or reduces responsibilities, thereby distorting beliefs about blame, and/or reduces the 
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level of offensiveness, thus, altering value. Because an organization’s image is directly linked 
to its reputation (Alvesson, 1998; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990), reputation is seen as a resource 
(Barney, 2001) worthy of defending. What then are the image repair practices used to reject 
responsibilities or reduce offensiveness?  
Dionisopolous & Vibbert (1988) argued that four image repair practices could be used, i.e. 
denial; bolstering; differentiation; and transcendence. An organization could deny performing 
the wrongful, or the occurrence of an incident (denial). Bolstering involves portraying a 
positive perception of the organization in light of a reputational damaging event such that the 
positive associations becomes the focal point. Differentiation uses favourable explanation of 
the incident to offset negative feelings with positive characteristics. Transcendence provides a 
more abstract interpretation of the character attack of an organization by appealing to values 
and loyalties. Harlow et al., (2011) drew on the work of Benoit (1994) and assessed the image 
repair practices used by the British Petroleum (BP) following the Gulf of Mexico Deepwater 
Horizon spill. They listed 10 additional image repair practices to the aforementioned including: 
shifting blame (someone else did it); provocation (we did it, but were provoked); defeasibility 
(lack of information or control), accident (the incident was an accident); good intentions (the 
error was the result of good intentions); minimization (it’s not that bad); attack accuser; 
compensation; corrective action; and mortification (Harlow et al., 2011). These practices 
explain “what” communications and actions can be taken by an organization in an attempt to 
correct negative public perception of themselves after a specific incident or series of incidents 
(Smudde & Courtright, 2008).  
Image repair practices also mix ideas from rhetorical discourse with justificatory account 
giving. Benoit (1994 p5) defines image “as the perception of a person (or group, or 
organization) held by the audience, shaped by the words and actions of that person [or 
organization] ….” This gives “image” a sociocultural perspective. This perspective suggests 
 8 
that image repair practice is heavily reliant on communication and information dissemination 
such that audiences receive words from the organization and based their judgement on such 
words. The communication could, therefore, go beyond the traditional communication to 
include subtle and often meaning-laden discourse which an organization can use to persuade 
its audience and shape their perceptions. To understand the dynamics of how persuasion could 
be achieved, we turn to IMT.  
McCornack et al., (1992) asserted that in any given conversation there exists a set of basic, 
reasonable assumptions about how transmission of information occurs. This premise is based 
on the work of Paul Grice (Grice, 1989) on Cooperation Principle (CP) and its maxims which 
describes a variety of manipulated message forms. The theory views manipulation as 
emanating from covert violations of one or more of Grice's four maxims (quality, quantity, 
relevance, and manner). According to McCornack et al., (1992), the violation of quantity 
maxim relates to altering the amount of information that should be provided in a message. 
Violation of quality maxim relates to prevarication of the veracity (truthfulness) of information 
that is presented whilst manipulation by evasion relates to the covert violation of the relevance 
maxim and manipulation by equivocation results from the covert violation of manner maxim 
(Anolli et al., 2001; Yeung, Levine, & Nishiyama, 1999). As seen in literature IMT has been 
used to understanding the way information is manipulated in public consultation for project 
proposals (Hurlimann & Dolnicar, 2010); to assess whether managers manipulate the 
measurement information that is used to assess performance (Fisher & Downes, 2008); and in 
assessing the intentional use of ambiguity in strategic organizational communication (Dulek & 
Campbell, 2015). This opens an opportunity for using the theory in assessing the robustness of 
communication by an organization involved in safety critical incidents in light of reputational 
tension, particularly, if such communications have safety and risk implications with respect to 
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emergency response, regulatory sanctions and enacting social trust. Consequently, we present 
the paper’s theoretical framing in Figure 1 below. 
 
***Insert Figure 1*** 
 
Through the twin theoretical conception of IRT and IMT, we were able to evaluate the 
meaning-laden discourse deployed by the organization in light of reputational concerns. This 
allowed us to assess, the image or reputational repair practices are deployed and how incident 
information is disseminated from the perspectives of veracity, manner, quality and quantity. In 
the next section, we discuss our theoretical conception of the reason an organization deploys 
rhetorical and metaphorical discourse in incident disclosure.  
3. Incident disclosure, rhetoric and metaphor 
Prior research has already illustrated that self-disclosure of incidents can be beneficial to 
organizations (Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005). However, incident disclosure whether self-
disclosed or disclosed by a third party will undoubtable raise questions about the safety 
performance of the affected organization. This is especially true for safety-critical operations 
as incidents emanating from such operations can be of devastating consequences to safety. 
When an incident happens and the consequence of such incident affects human and 
environmental safety, the condition of safety is said to be violated. Hence both individual and 
societal risk perceptions are shaped by the knowledge of such events. Moreover, because 
maximum level of safety corresponds with zero risk and a low safety level guaranteed 
corresponds with a risk of almost 100 percent (Aven, 2009; Suddle, 2009), the psychological 
elements of safety is shaped by incident knowledge obtained from incident disclosures. Indeed, 
an organization’s audience will judge its safety performance based on such knowledge. 
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Similarly, knowledge of incidents caused by deficiencies in the organization’s sociotechnical 
functionality may result in imposition of regulatory sanctions. This suggest the rationale behind 
the use of rhetorical and metaphoric discourse to achieve image repair during incident 
disclosures by such an organization. We define incident disclosure as the dissemination of 
incident related information by an organization to its audience for the purpose of safety 
management and risk governance including regulatory compliance, emergency communication 
and response, and liability management, and for ensuring social trust. 
There is a recognised link between the conscious uses of certain metaphors with the 
conveyance of biases (Tinker, 1986) in order to build ideological attachments (N. Fairclough, 
2014). Amernic & Craig (2017) discussed the use of metaphors in the camouflaging of ideology 
and its nuanced power during communication. Of similar application is the ‘art of persuasion’ 
called rhetoric (Larson, 2012). Rhetoric has been used as a means of cajoling audience to have 
similar viewpoints with a communicator, covertly. Whether the communicator’s viewpoints 
are true and valid or not, the use of rhetoric creates an informed appetite for good (Booth, 
2004). Hence, in order understand the application of metaphor and rhetoric during incident 
disclosure, we adopt a similar approach used by Amernic & Craig (2017) for analysing 
discourse by focusing on individual instances of metaphor and rhetoric in incident disclosure 
text (i.e., press release and incident reports) and also focusing on an underlying rhetoric and 
metaphoric structure of the text. To achieve this, we turn to discourse analysis as an analytical 
tool to aid in the analysis of collected archival incident reports and press releases following 
incidents involving NNPC’s operations. We describe this in our method in the succeeding 
section. 
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4. Method: a case study approach 
We adopt Yin’s (Yin, 2009, 2012) explanatory case study methodology as it is particularly 
suitable for answering “how” and “why” questions. For this research, we set out to develop an 
understanding of how NNPC discloses and communicate safety-critical incidents in the face of 
reputational tension. We purposively focus on the single case of NNPC because of the records 
of safety-critical incidents involving the organization (A. Ambituuni et al., 2015, 2018; 
Anifowose et al., 2012).  
As a state-owned National petroleum company, the NNPC own and operates safety critical 
upstream petroleum assets, via its six joint ventures with Shell, Chevron, Mobil, Agip, Elf, and 
Texaco (NNPC, 2017). NNPC is also a major downstream player through ownership of all four 
(4) existing refineries in Nigeria, distribution pipelines, depots, oil import jetties and retail 
stations. It also controls over 23% of the retails market subsector in Nigeria (Ambituuni, 
Amezaga, & Emeseh, 2014). Over the years, the organization has been implicated in many 
safety-critical incidents that has had devastating impact on human and environmental safety 
For instance, Ambituuni et al. (2015) calculated the failure frequency of the entire 5001KM 
pipeline network using 13 years’ incident records (from 2000 to 2012) and found that in 2011 
alone, for example, the NNPC reported a total of 2,787 pipeline failure. Such failures were 
attributed to operational deficiencies including poor practices and bureaucratic bottlenecks, and 
interdiction or sabotage of safety-critical assets (see for example A. Ambituuni et al., 2015; 
Anifowose et al., 2012).  
The safety and risk implication of such failures has been reported in Emeseh (2006), where, 
for instance, a pipeline explosion at Jesse community resulted in large scale environmental 
pollution and killed over 1,500 people including women and children. Omodanisi, Eludoyin, 
& Salami (2014) also reported 14 different incidents including the December 26, 2006 pipeline 
explosion in Ilado-Odo around Lagos Nigeria that killed over 250 people. Over the years, this 
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trend of safety critical-incidents has consistently occurred involving NNPC’s assets including 
the 2018 Aba pipeline incident that killed 30 people. NNPC is also known for its operational 
secrecy and practices that suggests the lack of transparency of information disclosed by the 
organization (Emeseh, 2006). The case of NNPC, therefore, offers a rich context to explore 
incident disclosure and communication versus reputation tension in light of these reported 
incident. 
The use of case study approach provides a robust method particularly when a holistic, in-depth 
investigation is required (Simons, 1996). The choice of a case study allowed us to study “how” 
NNPC discloses and communicate these incidents in the face of reputational tension, identify 
the image or reputational repair practices deployed and explain the dynamic of incident 
information disseminated from the perspectives of veracity, manner, quality and quantity. 
Furthermore, the method allowed us to draw our theoretical conception of IRT and IMT in 
order to provide new generalizable perspectives of accessing the incident information release 
by organizations, particular those involved in safety critical operations. To achieve a robust 
case-study methodology, we applied Yin’s five components of an effective case study research 
design. First, we established our aforementioned research questions by drawing of relevant 
literature. Second is the propositions or purpose of study which we’ve discussed in the 
introductory part of the paper. Based on this, our unit of analysis focuses on incident disclosures 
by the case of the NNPC. Fourth, the logic that links data to propositions was achieved 
following the data collection phase, as themes emerge. We analysed the data whilst building 
explanations about incident disclosure practices that appear in the data and linking these 
practices to the theoretical conception of the paper, thereby, answering the research questions. 
Finally, interpretation of findings was achieved through carefully extraction of meanings and 
theoretical links from the analysis (Yin, 2012). 
Framework for data collection and analysis  
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The unique data collection method in this study provides a more holistic context of incident 
disclosure and the image repair practices used by an organization as the study benefited from 
the communication of many incidents within a single case organization. Hence, although the 
study drew inspiration from the methods used in existing literature where the focus is on a 
single incident (e.g., Muralidharan et al. 2011, Harlow et al. 2011), our method was designed 
to overcome some of the observed limitations of focusing on a single incident. Consequently, 
we obtained historic incident disclosure and communication data from two key sources. First, 
170 incident reports were collected from NNPC’s Group Health, Safety and Environment 
(HSE) Department.  
In collecting these reports, we first wrote and obtained approval from the Group’s Chief 
Executive through the HSE Department. Notwithstanding, obtaining comprehensive data was 
especially challenging due to the secretive nature of the petroleum industry in Nigeria, and 
particularly the NNPC. For example, we experienced deliberate deletion of some details from 
the pipeline failure reports due to confidentiality claims. This, however, did not present 
analytical challenge in this study as the obtained reports contained the data we needed to 
address our research questions. Nevertheless, there is the need to presume that since the 
obtained reports was written by the HSE department of NNPC, such reports are vulnerable for 
company management preferences, corporate culture and specific investigation methods and 
work instructions. The HSE Department presents what happened the company way. This could 
mean that even larger manipulation exists within the obtained reports. Ideally, the ‘absolute 
truth’ established by a third party would be the best reference basis.  
Next, we carried-out a systematic internet search of the press releases and press statements by 
NNPC in light of the incidents reported. We reviewed 573 press releases/ statements on the 
NNPC website and further downloaded and reviewed 1114 online news articles using Nexis to 
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identify statements issued by the NNPC in response to incidents involving their assets and 
operations. Through this review, 30 relevant press releases were identified as shown in Table 
1. 
 
*** Insert Table 1*** 
 
As we have theoretically established earlier, image repair is achieved through discourse (Daly 
& Wiemann, 1994; Muralidharan et al., 2011). Hence, the paper adopted discourse analysis for 
analysing the obtained data. Discourse analysis sets out to answer questions about language, 
about writers and speakers, and about sociocultural processes that surrounds and gives rise to 
discourse (Gee, 2010). It involves paying close and systematic attention specifically to texts 
and their contexts. Indeed, we observe the different variation to discourse analysis, (N. 
Fairclough, 2014; N. L. Fairclough, 1985; van Dijk, 1996) with different analytical objectives. 
Hence, for this research attention was given to the use of discourse analysis in alignment to the 
research questions. Consequently, we adopted Gee’s definition of discourse i.e., ‘way of 
combining and integrating language [including rhetoric, metaphors], action, interventions, 
ways of thinking, believing, valuing, and using various symbols, tools, and objects to enact a 
particular sort of socially recognised identity’ (Gee 2010, pp. 21). This allowed us to consider 
three key elements of discourse during our analysis by paying attention to how NNPC is 
disclosing and communicating incident information, “who” NNPC is or trying to be and “what” 
NNPC is doing or trying to do in incident reports and press releases. 
 
Discourse analysis involves ‘a constant movement back and forth between theory and 
empirical data’ (Wodak 2004, pp. 200). Similar approach was adopted. We analysed our 
research data and develop empirical findings whilst constantly refining our theoretical 
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conception. This was achieved through the development of content categories (Robson, 2015). 
The content categories were then used to analyse NNPC’s incident disclosure model in relation 
to the tension between reputational concerns and risk communication objectives. The first step 
we took in our discourse analysis was to outline our categories and themes based on our 
research questions and the theoretical underpinning that emanate from our review of literature. 
Using NVivo, we then went through the obtained reports and press releases to see if it contains 
any of these themes and categories. At this point, necessary adjustment was made to include 
new themes and irrelevant themes where excluded. Furthermore, broader themes were broken 
down into sub-themes. At the end of this process, a list of coded discourse strands themes was 
obtained and reviewed. In the second step, we began looking at the structural features of the 
texts. We identified the sections within the text that dealt with particular discourse strands and 
the different discourse strands that overlapped. We further identify how the NNPC structure 
their incident disclosures in light of our theoretical conception of the research question. This 
led us to obtain a good idea of the macro-features of the text in our data.  
 
Finally, we zoomed in on the individual statements and discourse fragments by 
collecting all statements with a specific theme, and examining what the statements have to say 
on the respective discourse strand, vis-à-vis the context that informs the argument. This allowed 
us to analyse the function that intertextuality serves in light of the overall argument. Hence, we 
were able to identify and analyse the practices used by NNPC to achieve image repair vis-à-
vis any violation of conversational maxims observed within the themes generated. Also, to 
achieve validity and reliability, Yin’s tactics (construct validity, internal and external validity, 
and reliability) were carefully integrated. Construct validity was achieved by the use of 
multiple sources of evidence and the establishment of a chain of evidence. Internal and external 
validity were addressed mainly through explanation building and replication logic respectively. 
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Reliability was achieved using case study protocols and database such that data collection 
procedure can be repeated (Yin, 2009).” 
5. Result 
We set out to understand how” NNPC discloses and communicate safety-critical incidents in 
the face of reputational tension, identify the image or reputational repair practices and explain 
the dynamic of incident information disseminated from the perspectives of veracity, manner, 
quality and quantity. We found that in the process of disclosing incidents to its audience, NNPC 
pays great attention to its reputation, hence using image repair as a means of reputational 
defence whilst ignoring the principles of effective incident and risk communication even when 
human and environmental safety are at risk.  
 
5.1 Intertextual analysis and the development of organizational discourse 
The intertextual totality of the analysed incident reports and press release provides an insight 
into the approach used by NNPC to violate conversational maxims whilst disclosing incidents 
in the face of reputational tension. It further provides comprehension of NNPC’s inclination 
towards addressing reputational concerns against safety in its incident reports and press release. 
For instance, NNPC claims that “the safety of our people and the protection of our environment 
and assets are the main focus”. Paradoxically, we found the word ‘safety’ is used only 24 times 
in the entire 15272 words from the press releases and incident reports analysed. The text is 
dominated by statements concerning operational performance, reputational discourse and 
organizational efficiency. Indeed, the focus on performance, efficiency and reputation and the 
lack of use of the keyword ‘safety’ discursively indicates that safety is not a desired 
organizational state. Notably, also, is context in which the word ‘safety’ is used, and the 
missing emphasis on the risks associated with the incidents as well as the implications for 
objects at risk. Instead, the emphasis and the context in which the word safety was used centred 
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on portraying that the organization as capable, effective, efficient, and therefore, focused on 
the image of the organization.  
 
Table 2 represents the categories developed from the initial content analysis of the incident 
reports and press releases as a measure of reputational inclination. Throughout, there is an 
apparent privileging of reputational concerns over the safety of objects at risk and no 
acknowledgement of the sociotechnical deficiencies within the organization or disclosure of 
the complexity of safety culture as an ongoing organizational challenge. 
***Insert Table 2*** 
These emergent categories where further analysed into three organizational discourses: 
deflecting incident disclosure; the unavoidable incident syndrome and the unapologetic 
metaphor. These categories are discussed in the succeeding sections, focusing on how 
conversational maxims of quantity, quality, manner and relevance are violated to support the 
deployment of image repair strategies in alignment with the observed inclination toward 
reputational concerns.  
5.2 Deflecting incident disclosure  
Disclosure of accurate incident information illustrates a way of accepting safety deficiencies 
within sociotechnical systems of an organization. It suggests that such an organization is 
transparent to safety, accepts responsibilities for its deficiency and is ready to learn from the 
incident. On the contrary, we found NNPC deflecting attention whilst disclosing incidents to 
its audience. This is mostly done by violating the relevance maxims of the information provided 
during such disclosure. NNPC issue statements that lacks focus on the deficiencies which led 
to the incident it is disclosing but also attempts to engage its audience by assuring of its aptitude 
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to deliver what it deems a more relevant issue to them. An example is seen in NNPC’s press 
release following the October, 2013 Warri refinery fire incident, cited below. 
‘The Management of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, NNPC on Tuesday 
confirmed that there was a minor fire incident in the Topping Unit of the Warri Refining 
and Petrochemical Company, WRPC… We wish to seize this opportunity to reassure 
members of the general public that the NNPC continues to hold sufficient stock of 
premium motor spirit [petrol] and other petroleum products and therefore there is no cause 
for panic buying….’  (Press release document 2)  
We noted two traits of maxims violation from NNPC’s rhetoric above. First is an attempt to 
deflect attention from what may potentially be a dangerous occurrence to what NNPC termed 
a ‘minor fire incident’. We called this act of manipulation of information deflection by 
trivialisation. In doing so, NNPC deflected its audience attention from the potential catastrophe 
that may have occurred. The word “minor” is used in this context as a way of deflecting the 
seriousness of the incident. The focus on reputational concern appears to pressure the 
organization into reducing the veracity of the information communicated by trivialising the 
magnitude of the incident. Indeed, a fire incident in the Topping Unit of an oil refinery should 
be considered a very serious incident and a dangerous occurrence. We found similar use of 
terms like ‘minor challenge’ and ‘inconsequential incident’ used by NNPC to describe 
dangerous occurrences and serious incidents in 121 of the 170 incident reports. We also 
observed how NNPC trivialised incident communication in their press releases by excluding 
the causality information. For instance, even though 4 people died in the September, 2017 
NNPC Apapa jetty fire, the press release by NNPC excluded this detail. 
 
Second is the attempt to shape perception by deflecting the attention of it audience from the 
entire event to what NNPC considers a more relevant issue. Because of its complete dominance 
of the refining, supply and distribution of petroleum product in Nigeria, NNPC knows that 
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failure in its system will almost certainly result in a nationwide fuel scarcity, with potential of 
crippling economic activities on a national scale. Hence, in this instance it uses this knowledge 
to deflect attention from the ‘minor incident’ to its aptitude in averting fuel scarcity. By 
asserting this, NNPC showcases itself as a solution to ‘panic buying’ despite the ‘minor fire 
incident’. We consider this an act of deflection by rationalisation. The trait of rationalisation 
in this act of information manipulation is evident in the way NNPC attempts to deal with 
potential stressors, away from safety concerns, that may have emanated from the incident 
through the elaboration of reassuring explanations. We cite another example below. 
‘The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, NNPC, on Friday explained that routine 
gas supply for power generation is not affected by the fresh fire incident which engulfed 
a segment of the Escravos-Lagos Pipeline System’ (Press release 21). 
Another trait of deflection observed is in the way in which NNPC communicates its HSE 
strategies as an integral part of incident disclosures. As cited in the example below NNPC 
recognises the importance of a good safety culture, and positions itself as an organization with 
a good safety policy whilst citing external examples of organizations involved in disastrous 
incidents to portray the implication of bad safety culture. In doing so, NNPC appears to distance 
itself from being involved in incidents thereby providing a false sense of good safety 
performance, even though the disseminated message is linked to an incident involving the 
organization.  
 ‘The deployment of a solid Health, Safety & Environment (HSE) policy in NNPC’s 
business and operations has been described as “critical” to the on-going transformation 
programme in the Corporation… According to the GMD (Group Managing Director), it is 
pertinent for Chief Executives in the oil and gas industry to be HSE-conscious so as to 
prevent incidents and minimize environmental impacts. He noted that recent happenings 
in the global oil and gas industry like the Gulf of Mexico BP Oil Spill and the Chevron’s 
Brazil Offshore incident further necessitated the desire to inculcate HSE among all staff of 
the Corporation.’ (Press release document 13). 
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Here, NNPC describes its HSE policy as ‘solid’ and ‘critical’ to its ongoing transformation. 
The ‘solid’ and ‘critical’ metaphor evokes a sense of effective HSE policy that is, indeed, very 
important. However, it is the context in which this press release was deployed that captured 
our attention. We noted the way in which NNPC swiftly deflected attention from the incident 
being disclosed by citing incidents from other oil and gas operators at a global scene. We 
consider this an act of deflection by distantiation. Distantiation was achieved through the 
characterization of other operators as actors with bad safety performance. In doing so, the 
organization created characters that audiences can link bad safety performance to, thereby, 
deflecting such characteristics from itself and distancing itself from an object of scrutiny. 
Indeed, NNPC has been involved in some of the worse cases of incidents and disasters the 
global oil and gas industry has seen including the earlier stated pipeline explosion at Jesse 
community on 15 October, 1998 that killed over 1,500 people including women and children 
and the December 26, 2006 pipeline explosion in Ilado-Odo which killed more than 250 people.  
 
Distantiation was also observed in incident disclosure practises that focused on demonstrating 
capabilities of the organization as a means of obscuring the seriousness of the incident. This 
practise is manifested in NNPC’s strong defence of its safety systems and procedures despite 
failures that resulted in disastrous incidents. Typical examples are the use of phrases like: ‘the 
gallantry of a team of engineers and technicians’, ‘the effectiveness of the firefighting 
equipment’, ‘the efficiency of our fire fighters’ and ‘the gallantry of NNPC personnel’ whilst 
reporting on incidents that had occurred with serious levels of consequences. The rhetoric from 
these phrases attempts to deflect attention to the robustness of the safety systems and 
procedures within NNPC whilst ignoring the severity of the incident on the public. 
5.3 The ‘unavoidable incident’ syndrome  
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The ‘unavoidable incident’ syndrome associates incident occurrence to factors that on the 
surface, seem like they are unavoidable and are merely part of day to day safety critical 
operations. The aim of such communication maxims violation is to normalise incident 
occurrence and provide a metaphor that suggests that nothing can be done to avoid such 
incidents, and that such incidents are associated to “normal mechanical or systems” fault. We 
illustrate how NNPC uses this information manipulation strategy from the citation below.  
‘We are committed to doing all within our powers… in order to eliminate avoidable 
incidents’ (Press release document 14)  
From the above citation, NNPC attempts to demonstrate to its audience that there is a limit to 
what the organization can do to ensure safety is optimised from its operations and to mitigate 
any associate risks. The word “powers” is used in this context as a means of demonstrating 
absolute commitment which, however, can be constraint by forces beyond that power. This 
means that some incidents are simply “unavoidable”. The term “avoidable incidents” is further 
used to reinforce the suggestion that some incidents are, indeed, mere accidents. The overall 
strategy of communication and incident disclosure here adopts a positive self-presentation 
using a metaphor that constructs an ideology of absolute commitment, and hinged on accidents 
which “simply just” occur.  
The violation of conversational maxims by NNPC is mostly observed in the disclosure of 
incidents which NNPC claimed are associated with technical faults beyond their control. For 
instance, in the obtained incident reports, NNPC associated 4 incident causation factors to 
‘pump overheating’, 1 to ‘failed mechanical seal’, 3 to ‘electrical fault’, and 2 to ‘auto ignition’. 
This narrow association of incidents to technical faults ignores the links between technical 
systems with human factors, organizational and regulatory deficiencies, procedure failures and 
dysfunctional work environment developed at various sociotechnical levels of the organization 
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(Rasmussen, 1997). In doing so, NNPC covertly exonerate itself from such deficiencies as 
though the failed technical systems existed independent of its procedures, people, work 
environment and organization.  
5.4 The “unapologetic” metaphor 
We have seen many safety critical operating companies apologising following incidents and 
disasters involving their assets. A typical example is the unreserved apology by BP's CEO 
following the Gulf of Mexico disaster. An apology during incident disclosure accords an 
organization  the opportunity to admit failures or errors within their sociotechnical systems and 
express remorse to its audience (Coombs et al., 2010). Sincere and unreserved apology makes 
use of terminologies that expresses regretful acknowledgement of one’s failure, typically 
integrating the phrase ‘I’m sorry’.  We found NNPC using metaphor that provides an 
appearance of sympathy whilst camouflaging an unapologetic stance in its incident disclosure 
strategy. For instance, in a statement issued by the NNPC’s Group Managing Director (GMD) 
following the Okogbe community tanker fire that killed 95 persons, the GMD avoided issuing 
an apology but provided metaphoric condolence that appears regretful by stating that his: 
 ‘…heart and that of the entire NNPC family is with the government and people of Rivers 
State, especially those who lost loved ones, at this time of great sorrow and grief.’ (Press 
release document 15) 
The ‘heart’ metaphor evokes emotion and emphasises the sympathy of the entire organization 
towards the victims and their loved ones. Furthermore, by issuing a personalised condolence, 
the GMD expresses his sympathy which only provides good will and neutral sentiments but 
failed to express remorse, guilt, and self-criticism, thereby, evading taking responsibility for 
the actions of NNPC. This may be an attempt to disenfranchise victims from taking legal 
actions as an apology is perceived as an admission of liability, or a conscious attempt to evade 
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responsibility considering all NNPC trucks tankers are operated via franchise ownership. 
Notwithstanding, his lack of apology ignores the appropriate moral remedy offered by an act 
of apology even for blameless harms. 
6. Implications: theoretical and managerial perspectives 
We found that the sociocultural perspective of image and reputational concerns drives an 
organization to deploy discourse in such a manner that shapes public perception of its 
reputation when involved in incidents that violate public safety. In such instance, however, the 
priority should be on safety (Sturges, 1994; Coombs et al., 2010) with risk communication 
focusing of public safety. Image repair communication should come afterwards. On the 
contrary, we found NNPC paying greater attention to image repair and ignoring the need for 
effective risk communication during incident disclosure. Table 3 below shows the discursive 
incident disclosure information assessment framework developed from the case organization 
as a model for understanding the interface between the deployment of image repair practices 
in the face of reputational tension and the way conversational maxims are violated. 
***Insert Table 3*** 
 
The evaluation of incident disclosures through the twin lens of IRT and IMT provides a micro-
level assessment of image repair discourse that looked beyond what the practices are (e.g., 
Benoit, 1995; Dionisopolous and Vibbert, 1988; Harlow, Brantley and Harlow, 2011) to 
understanding how conversational maxims are violated in support of image repair. 
Consequently, we observed the predisposition and link between the violations of certain 
conversational maxims to deploy image repair practices as an outcome. For instance, 
trivialisation achieved by reducing the quality maxim of information provides rhetoric that the 
incident is not that bad, hence supporting minimisation image repair practice. Similarly, 
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deflection by rationalisation supports transcendence, whilst deflection by distantiation 
achieved through the violation of relevance and manner maxims supports bolstering. Notably, 
also, the violation of certain maxims and the permutations of such violation can support or 
allow the deployment of a single or multiple image repair discourse. 
Table 3 also illustrates the safety and risk management implication of such practices. For 
instance, deflection as it relates to organizational safety and risk governance can impact on the 
organization’s ability to accept responsibility for its poor safety performance and, therefore, 
unable to see faults in its safety systems and procedures. This practice continuously downplays 
severity of risk associated to incidents and obscures the safety implications which could, 
otherwise, be a pivot for scrutiny and enhancement of the sociotechnical operating systems. 
Hence, deflecting incident disclosure will avert criticism and scrutiny of the organization’s 
audience. Furthermore, deflection may also lead to a false sense of safety and risk management 
capabilities. Similarly, the unavoidable incident syndrome limits the organization’s ability to 
link failures of technical systems to failures in sociotechnical functions.   
Indeed, prioritising the image of the organization through deflection during incident disclosure 
falsely influences reception and acceptance of risk information by potential risk receptors and 
objects at risk. This may have further safety implication on emergency response especially if 
the seriousness and potential consequence of the incident is downplayed such that it further 
exposes people to greater danger, hence diminishing social trust. A typical example is the 
pipeline explosion at Jesse community earlier reported where the NNPC adopted an aggressive 
image repair practice that downplayed the severity of the secondary risk associated with the 
incident and further threatened victims with prosecution. Consequently, many injured victims 
died whilst evading hospitals amidst the fear of being arrested. This reportedly contributed to 
the demise of over 1,500 people (Emeseh, 2006). This practice can be seen to be at conflict 
with Kasperson's (2014) call for enhancing social trust in safety and risk communication by 
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organizations. Organizations disclosing safety critical-incidents need to be open to better 
deliberative fair information dissemination process in order to produce acceptable outcomes 
locally and internationally.  
We did not find data pertaining to NNPC's communication to an international audience and 
offering possible explanations owing to the relative lack of international media coverage of 
safety incidents in Nigeria when compared to e.g., the BP Deep Water Horizon incident. This 
could be due to the fact that NNPC is a NOC rather than an International Oil Company (IOC), 
hence, its operations are local and it is not really subject to much international scrutiny. 
Consequently, it focuses on its national stakeholders and local media. This, really, is partly a 
failing of the international oil industry and press/media as well as NNPC IOC partners who 
don't apply pressure on NNPC either because they are also complicit in such safety failings or 
don't want to “rock the boat”. Improving such communication will require a close attention to 
be paid to the values of the people (Wardman, 2008) achieved though adequate and reliable 
information dissemination and engagement process (Arvai & Rivers, 2014; Kasperson, 2014; 
Lidskog, 2008; McComas, 2014) locally and internationally. The social performance and trust 
of an organization has been conceptualized in terms of its demonstrative responsible behaviour 
toward community, environment, and employees (Ghosh, 2017). This should not be eroded by 
manipulation of incident information even in the face of reputational and regulatory tension. 
7. Conclusion  
We set out to develop an understanding of how the effective communication of safety-critical 
incidents take place in the face of organizational reputational tension. Focused on the case of 
NNPC and found the use of image and reputational repair strategies whilst also violating 
conversational maxims during incident disclosures that threatens the reputation of the 
organization. We empirically identified four categories where the violation of conversational 
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maxims was used to deflect attention, portray a sense of capability, evade blame and avoided 
issuing apologies. We also found incident disclosures by NNPC consistently focusing on 
reputational concerns against safety concerns.  
We argue that the paper makes the following contributions. First, by identifying NNPC’s 
inclination towards reputational concerns during incident disclosure, we provide an insight into 
the actual industry practices which shows that amidst the tension between reputational concerns 
versus effective risk communication of safety critical incidents, organizations tend to focus on 
their reputation. However, this practice has wider safety and risk management implications 
which we discussed in our findings. Organizations can, therefore, draw on the wider 
implications identified as rationale for developing effective incident communication strategies 
that pays greater attention on the safety of risk receptors.  
Second, our assessment of incident disclosures through the twin lens of IRT and IMT provides 
a micro-level analysis of image repair discourse that looked beyond what the practices to 
understanding how conversational maxims are violated to support the deployment of image 
repair practices. Consequently, we provided a theoretical point of integration between the two 
theories in our discursive incident disclosure information assessment framework. However, the 
limitation of the study should be observed. The framework presented, is context specific to the 
disclosure of incidents by the NNPC, which is, indeed, a very unique but important case. 
Notwithstanding, the framework provides a nuanced theoretical model which scholars can use 
to support the assessment of the veracity, manner, quality and quantity of information released 
by an organization whilst disclosing incidents. It also provides a means of understanding the 
safety and risk management implication of such practices to the organization.  
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Appendix: Details of relevant press releases from NNPC website 
Doc. 
No. 
Title of press release Year of 
publication 
1 NNPC urges Reps to create laws to check pipeline vandalism.... 2010 
2 Press Release-Warri Refinery Fire Incident: NNPC Says No Cause for Alarm 2012 
3 Press Statement: NNPC GMDs Forum 2016 
4 PPMC Takes Sensitization Campaign to Grassroots 2011 
5 Pipeline Vandalism Identified As Malaise In Petroleum Industry 2011 
6 Chief of Army Staff Visits NNPC 2012 
7 Nigerian Army to collaborate with NNPC in Niger-Delta .... 2010 
8 Fuel Queues Will Vanish Soon, FG Assures 2012 
9 Atlas Cove Attack: How Gallant NNPC Engineers Saved Nigeria from Fuel 
Calamity 
2010 
10 How Pipeline Vandals Cripple Fuel Supply - NNPC....Incurs over N174 
billion in products losses, pipeline repairs 
2013 
11 You Can't Shut down Gas Plants, Barkindo Warns Shell - Says Excuse of 
Non-Evacuation of Condensate not Tenable 
2013 
12 Press Release – Mosimi Fire: Vandals responsible 2012 
13 HSE Critical to NNPC Transformation 2011 
14 NNPC Commits to Global Safety in Retail Outlets to Reduce Incidents… 2012 
15 NNPC GMD Commiserates with Rivers Govt and People over Tanker Fire 2013. 
16 Make IT, Safety, A Way of Life, GMD Charges NNPC Staff... As 
Corporation Unveils Innovative IT HSE Tools and Solutions 
2012 
17 Minna Depot Fire Incident a minor Challenge - NNPC 2013 
18 Press Release - Atlas Cove: NNPC Assures of Viability of Depot 2010 
19 Arepo Pipeline Incident: Yakubu Allays Fear of Fuel Scarcity 2011 
20 NNPC says Suleja depot fire incident will not affect supply of petroleum 
products 
2010 
21 Update on Escravos pipeline fire: gas supply to power plants remains intact - 
NNPC  
2018 
22 NNPC says Apapa jetty fire incident will not affect supply of petroleum 
products 
2017 
23 Four feared dead as NNPC Apapa jetty catches fire 2017 
24 Scores Feared Dead as Another Explosion Rocks NNPC Pipeline 2015 
25 Update on Escravos Pipeline Fire: Gas Supply to Power Plants Remains 
Intact – NNPC 
2018 
26 NNPC Intensifies Efforts to Safeguard Pipelines 2017 
27 NNPC Cautions Consumers against Panic Buying Sequel to Calabar Tank 
Farm Fire Incident 
2017 
28 NNPC Subsidiary, IDSL, Explains Pipeline Explosion 2017 
29 Reforms: NNPC'll get it right this time around - Lukman 2009 
30 Fresh Escravos Pipeline Explosion: Gas Supply Resumes Today 2018 
Note 
The shaded items are the press releases which we cited directly in this article 
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Figure 
 
Figure 1: Twin theoretical conception of IRT and IMT 
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Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1. Data collected over the period of 2007 to 2018 
 No. of incident reports No. of press release 
 170 30 
 
Relevance of 
data 
Provided disclosure context and a means of 
assessing how incident information is 
controlled to evade scrutiny 
Provided perspectives on disclosure of 
incidents amidst reputation concerns in 
the public domain (both local and 
international) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The measure of reputational concerns in incident disclosures 
Reputational measure Reoccurrence 
There was a minor fire incident  
Minor challenge  
Inconsequential incident 
The fire was promptly brought under control 
The fire was successfully extinguished  
The effectiveness of our equipment  
The efficiency of our fire fighters 
The gallantry of NNPC personnel  
We reassure members of the general of sufficient stock  
The incident was caused by vandals  
HSE efficiency in the corporation  
Efficiency of collaboration to foster security of operations 
There was very little damage  
We are going to solve the problem soon 
We adhere strictly to good HSE practice 
We maintain a high safety culture  
NNPC places premium on safety of life 
The incident was an accident 
It was a normal technical fault 
We sympathise with the victims 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
3 
9 
4 
3 
1 
2 
4 
3 
4 
2 
4 
10 
1 
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Table 3. Incident disclosure information assessment framework 
Practices Violation of 
conversational maxims  
 
Reputational repair 
outcomes 
Safety and risk management 
implications 
Deflecting 
incident 
disclosure 
Reduction of information 
quality. 
 
Trivialising incident 
magnitude 
 
Deflection by 
trivialisation 
 
Minimization (it’s not 
that bad) 
Organisation misses out on 
accepting responsibility and the 
learning from such incident. 
 
False sense of safety and risk 
management capabilities. 
 
Very little information about the 
incidents and its safety 
implications 
 
Wider implications on emergency 
response communication 
 
Invokes social mistrust 
Reduction of information 
relevance by elaboration 
of reassuring 
explanations 
 
Reduction of information 
relevance by focussing 
on the potential stressors 
of the object at risk.  
 
Deflection by 
rationalisation. 
 
Appealing the 
organisation’s value and 
commitment. 
 
 
Reduction of relevance 
by evasion and the 
creation of external bad 
characters. 
 
Dissemination of 
ambiguousness of 
information 
 
Reduction of veracity of 
information to 
demonstrate robustness 
of the safety systems 
Deflection by 
distantiation 
 
Bolstering by portraying 
a positive perception of 
the organisation. 
 
Distancing the 
organisation from 
scrutiny. 
 
Reduction of veracity of 
information to 
demonstrate robustness 
of the safety systems 
 
The 
“unavoidable 
incident” 
syndrome 
Normalisation of incident 
occurrences  
 
Positive self-presentation 
using a metaphor that 
constructs ideology of 
absolute commitment 
 
Covert exoneration of the 
organisation from it risk 
management deficiencies 
 
There is a limit to what 
we can do to avoid 
accidents. 
 
 
Unable to link failures of 
technical systems to failures of 
sociotechnical functions of the 
organisation 
The 
“unapologetic” 
metaphor 
Expression condolence, 
but evade apologies 
Expression of neutral 
sentiments. 
 
Avoid taking 
responsibility 
Ignores the appropriate moral 
remedy from issuing apology 
 
Weakens post-incident 
stakeholder relationships and trust 
 
 
